We formalize Burstall's (1974) intermittent assertions method (initially conceived for proving total correctness of sequential programs) and generalize it to handle inevitability proofs for nondeterministic transition systems, hence (in particular) parallel programs.
Programs are modeled by transition systems, program executions by sets of complete traces and program properties by inevitability properties of transition systems (generalizing total correctness of programs). It follows that the study is independent of any particular programming language. The basic proof principle that we derive from Burstall's and Manna and Waldinger's (1978) description of the intermittent assertions method is shown to be sound. It is also semantically complete under a condition on execution traces and inevitable properties. This condition is satisfied when considering inevitability properties such as total correctness or properties involving unary assertions on states. However, we conjecture that (even for deterministic programs) the basic proof principle is not complete when considering arbitrary binary inevitability properties (which relate state values at different "time instants").
This conjecture leads us to a generalization of Burstall's intermittent assertions method using transfinite induction (to handle unbounded nondeterminism) and using auxiliary or ghost variables in the limited form of ternary intermittent assertions (which can relate state values on program entry and at two other different "time instants").
Introduction
We formalize Burstall's intermittent assertions method [3] initially conceived for proving total correctness of sequential programs and generalize it to handle inevitability properties of nondeterministic and parallel programs. Programs are modeled by transition systems (Section 2) and program executions by sets of complete traces (Section 3) so that the study is independent of any particular programming language. We consider inevitability properties of programs such as total correctness, accessibility of a critical section, liveness of processes which must eventually progress, responsiveness to a request, etc. (Section 4). In Section 5 we derive from examples in [3, lo] a basic proof principle which is a very concise formulation of Burstall's intermittent assertions method. The method is shown to be sound. Using transfinite (instead of finite) induction to handle unbounded nondeterminism, the basic induction principle is shown to be semantically complete under a sufficient (but not necessary) condition on execution traces and inevitable properties. This condition holds in particular when considering total correctness of programs as in [3] . It is also satisfied for unary inevitable properties which depend only upon final states (a restriction considered by Pnueli [1 11, Apt and Delporte [l] and Manna and Pnueli [9] [3, lo] , where lemmas are always of the form "if sometime 4(X,, . . . . X,)AX~=-Y~A...AX,=X, at / then sometime $(x~,...,x,, x1, . . . . X,) at I"' (where X1, . . . . X,) are the program variables and x1, . . . ,x, their respective symbolic values at program point I). This is captured in our basic induction principle using binary inevitable properties (better than by imposing adequate restrictions on the use of auxiliary variables that would depend upon the syntax of programs). However, we conjecture that even for deterministic programs there are inevitable properties for which the use of binary assertions is not semantically complete.
This conjecture leads us in Section 6 to a generalization of Burstall's intermittent assertions method using transfinite induction (to handle unbounded nondeterminism) and ternary intermittent assertions (thus allowing for lemmas of the more general form"ifsometime~(~, ,..., x,,X, ,..., X,)~X,=x,~~~~~X,=x,atIthensometime $4X 1 ,..., x,,xl ,..., x,,X1 ,..., X,) at I"', where XI, . . ..?&I (resp. x1, . . ..x.) denote the values of the program variables XI, .., X, on program entry (resp. at program point /). This generalized induction principle is then proved to be sound and semantically complete. In Section 7 we derive a series of induction principles which are successive generalizations of the above proof principle. This broadens the range of application of the method [for example, when using infinite well-ordered sets of intermittent assertions (which can be given finite presentations by means of auxiliary termination variables) Burstall's method can be extended so as to incorporate Floyd's method [7] ]. Moreover, the consideration of more and more abstract formalizations should lead to a better understanding of Burstall's method (for example, it is shown that hand-simulation and induction upon the data can be understood in a unified manner and reduced to computational induction in a form essentially more expressive than Floyd's method [7] ). The successive generalizations introduce more flexibility to write proofs but no additional proof power, since all considered proof principles are shown to be sound and semantically complete and hence equivalent.
The completeness argument consists in showing that "a la Floyd" proofs can be reformulated using "a la Burstall" proofs (i.e. computational induction can be reduced to induction upon the data). However, this argument is not fully satisfactory because the style of the allowable proofs is fixed. Users of Burstall's method need a stronger completeness result since they want to know if the lemmas that they are going to use in their proofs can always be chosen freely. A positive answer is given in Section 8 (with the necessary and sufficient condition that each lemma involves a property which is inevitable for the program but also relatively to the other lemmas which are used in its proof).
Programs as transition systems
The operational semantics of a programming language associates a transition system (S, t, 4) with each program of the language: 0 S is a non-empty set of states, Program states are of the form (c,n,p) where the control state c is a program label and the memory state associates integer values n,p~Z with the program variables N, P:
Execution should begin at program point "Start" with a positive initial value n for N and an arbitrary value p for P. Therefore, 0 $=A (c,n,p 
Program executions as complete traces
Executions of a program (S, t, 4) will be modeled as a set C( S, t, 4) of sequences of states called complete execution traces. A sequence p =popl pz . in Z( S, r, 4) (where pi is short for p(i)), represents an execution that starts in state p,,, performs the first program step to reach program state pl, performs the next program step to reach program state p2, etc. Since execution must start in some initial state po, this sequence cannot be empty. When execution does not terminate, this sequence is infinite. A finite sequence p. . ..pn ends with a blocking state p,, which has no possible successor state.
Therefore traces represent complete executions (as opposed to their prefixes which represent executions still in progress). More formally, l o is the set of natural numbers; l 0 is the empty set (also written 0) or zero; l ifn~oandn#Othennwilldenote{O,...,n-l}(sothatm~nisequivalenttom<~); l if E is a set then Ewx={y~E: y#x} and 115 is the cardinality of E;
. BE(S--t{ttff}), p = is. [VS'ES.~ t( s, s')] characterizes blocking states; 0 C"(S,t,+)=& empty traces, are not considered; 0 C"(S,t,f$)=(pE(n+S): ~(po)AVi~(n-l).t(pi,Pi+l)AP(p,_,)}: finite complete traces of length n > 0; 0 Z" (S,t,c$) (S,t,~) . [(po=s)~(3i~k.~(pO,pi) )].
In other words, inevitability is strong when the number i of program steps necessary for reaching the "final" state pi is bounded by an integer k depending only on the "initial" state po. ljE(S x S+{tt, ff}) .
IS weakly inevitable for (S, t, C$I ) if and only if t,G is inevitable for (S, t, 4) but not strongly.
Example 4.1. The program in Example 2.1 computes P = 2" when the initial value n of N is positive. This total correctness property can be expressed formally by the statement that
Termination is strong since traces have n+ 3 states when initially N=n>O.
Program properties are expressed using sets (or their characteristic functions) and not formal languages. This is because we want to get rid of those incompleteness problems which are due to the inconvenient choice of assertion languages which are not expressive enough in order to describe these sets.
The basic induction principle underlying Burstall's intermittent assertions method
In this section we work out a basic induction principle which is a very concise formulation of Burstall's method. In the next section we shall relax a number of restrictions which cause incompleteness problems and derive more abstract and general induction principles which generalize Burstall's method.
The best way to convince the reader that our basic induction principle indeed corresponds to Burstall's method would be to derive it from an already existing formalization of the method. Since no such existing formalization is general enough and widely accepted, the best we can do is to start from Burstall's proof of the program in Example 2.1 [3] using Manna and Waldinger's notations [lo] . The treatment of Burstall's other examples is similar but would be too long to be included here.
I. Prouing inevitability properties of programs
The total correctness of the program in Example 2.1 is specified by the following proposition:
l if sometime n >, 0 A N = n at Start then sometime P = 2" at Finish.
The proof of this proposition involves the following lemma:
Burstall observed that in the above statements n and p are mathematical variables whereas N and P are not since their meaning depends on context. The use of both mathematical and program variables in the same statement might be confusing (for example, from N = n and N = 0 we cannot conclude that n = 0 in the above lemma). This confusion can be avoided if we get rid of program variables using different mathematical variables to denote values of program variables at different "time instants". For example, the lemma could be written as follows:
l if sometime n 20 at Loop then sometime n' = 0 A p' =p x 2" at Loop.
This means:
"For all n, if rz 30 holds and execution of the program is started at label Loop with program variables N and P having values II and p then control will eventually pass through Loop with some values n' and p' of the program variables N and P such that n' = 0 A p' = p x 2" is satisfied". Therefore the lemma simply asserts that 8,=i~((c,n,p),(c',rz',p') Only a finite number, 1 A 1, of lemmas should be used.
Remark. Since Burstall [3] considered only deterministic and total programs, the statement
can also be understood as 3s~C(S,t,&).3i~Dom(s).B(so,Si), where All results in the present paper can very easily be adapted to this existential interpretation.
However, we have chosen to develop the universal interpretation because it is more suitable for total correctness (and more generally inevitability properties) of nondeterministic programs with depth search execution, [S] hence parallel programs.
An example of proof
Now that we have obtained an abstract formalization of programs and inevitable properties of programs, let us come back to the example in order to capture the essence of Burstall's proof method.
The proof of proposition 8r is the following. For example, the proof of proposition (!I1 involved the discovery of the following intermittent assertions:
If=jb ((c,n,p),(c',n',p') ). [c'=Startr\n'>Or\n'=n], I:=~((c,n,p),(c',n',p') ). [c'=LoopAn'~Or\n'=n/\p'=l], whereas the proof of lemma o0 involves the discovery of I~=3.((c,n,p),(c',n',p') ). [c'=Loopr\n'30r\n'=nr\p'=p] , Z~=R((c,n,p),(c',n',p') I~=A ((c,n,p),(c',n',p') ). [c'=Loopr\n'=Or\p'=px2"] . sometime P=2" at Finish (conclusion).
Remark 2. According to Burstall [3] , " [sometime P at L J says that there exists a state during the execution which is at L and has property P". Stated otherwise, all intermittent assertions 1: involved in the inevitability proof of lemma 8i should be inevitable for (S, t, cl) . This interpretation of intermittent assertions is inconsistent. For example I h never holds during execution when initially N = 0. More generally, Burstall treats tests by case analysis [3] , so that the intermittent assertions involved in each case might not be inevitable for those initial states not corresponding to the considered case. We shall choose another interpretation of intermittent assertions so that case analysis causes no problem since only the disjunction of the intermittent assertions corresponding to all cases will have to be inevitable for all initial states.
Verljication conditions
In a valid proof of inevitability of & for (S, t,El), intermittent assertions I y', , I:, Zp are derived from one another according to rules (for computing the effect of an assignment or test, for using a lemma, etc.). Burstall's informal rules [3] can be understood as verification conditions that must be satisfied by the intermittent assertions. These verification conditions are now expressed formally.
Premises
All proofs in [3] start with the assumption of the premises sl of the proposition or lemma 8, which is proved. Stated otherwise, 1;' should hold when the current state s' is an initial state s:
or, more simply,
For instance, the proof of proposition 8i starts with the check that \J(c,n,P)ES.(&1((c,n,P))~l:((c,n,p),(c,n,p))) (where c=Start and n 20 or else s1 is false so that the verification condition is obviously true), whereas for lemma B0 we have
(where c = Loop, n 30 in the nonevident case).
Hand simulation
Assume that the proof of proposition 8, worked forward until reaching intermittent assertion If which is not the last one. The next step in the proof can be taken by hand simulation.
For total deterministic programs, Burstall's rules for computing the effect of an assignment or test [3] check that the current state s' satisfying 1f has a successor state s" satisfying some intermittent assertion Z{ which has to be taken into consideration later in the proof so that j < i:
For example, in the proof of proposition 8,) assignment P:= 1 leads from r 13 J to f 12 J and corresponds to the following verification condition:
where c' = Start, n' 20, n' = n or the condition is obviously verified. The test N ~0 leads from r 11 J to f 10 J and corresponds to the verification condition
In the proof of lemma Q,,, the loop body leads from CO2 J to TO1 J (In accordance with the operational semantics of the program in Example 2.1, the loop body should be treated as an atomic action.) The corresponding verification condition is wherec'=Loop,n'=n,p'=p,n'>O,c"=Loop,n"=n'-l,p"=2xp'orthecondition is trivially satisfied. Such verification conditions are not sufficient when nondeterminism is involved since it must also be proved that no blocking state is reachable.
Hence, hand simulation should ensure the existence of at least one successor state:
and check that all possible successor states satisfy some intermittent assertion considered later:
Using lemmas in the proof of propositions
In the proof of proposition 8,) intermittent assertion f 11 J is derived from f 12 J using lemma oO. It must first be checked that all current states s' satisfying r 11 J also satisfy the premises a,, of lemma do. Then, by applying the lemma it must be proved that all successors s" of s' by tIO satisfy r 12 J . The corresponding verification conditions are the following:
where in the nonbanal case c'= Loop, n'>O,
More generally, the verification condition corresponding to the use of a lemma in the proof of a proposition is (temporarily)
Vs,s'ES.[lf(s,s')~(3/'E/1.[&I~(s')AVs"~S.[~I,(s',s")~ ilj<i.I{(s,s")]])].
Observe that (contrary to the case of hand simulation) the test that current states s' satisfy the premises cl, of lemma &, ensures the existence of at least one successor s" to s' (unless improbably &, is the identity lemma, i.e. Q,,( s', s") => (s' = s")). This is because lemma BIS is separately proved to be inevitable for C( S, t, Ed,).
Apropos of the use of lemmas, notice that Burstall relies upon the mathematical culture of his readers and does not take the trouble to state elementary logical rules such as "proofs of lemmas and propositions should not be circular" [3] . Yet such rules have to be captured in the formalization of Burstall's method. A simple way consists in partially ordering the set n of lemmas by a well-founded ordering CK such that 1 'oc 1 is understood as "the inevitability proof of &, does not depend upon the assumption that 611 is inevitable". The (permanent) verification condition corresponding to the use of a lemma in the proof of a proposition is now the following:
Moreover, since the set n is finite and cx is well-founded we can always (up to a rank function) choose /1 as a set of positive numbers and K as the corresponding natural ordering <.
A little induction
Burstall proves lemmas using various forms of the principle of mathematical induction [3] which are all equivalent to the following:
For example, in the proof of lemma do, intermittent assertion (00 J is derived from assertion (01 J using lemma (I0 as induction hypothesis. This is valid because
Then, by induction hypothesis, we derive intermittent assertion 1: such that We infer from the example that the verification condition for the use of a lemma as induction hypothesis in the proof of this lemma should be of the form =s 3j<iJ;(s,s")])].
Conclusion
Starting from the premises E, of a lemma, a proof of this lemma ends when some intermittent assertion If has been derived which implies the conclusion 8, of the lemma: Finally, observe that in a proof all intermediate intermittent assertions should be processed (either by hand simulation or by using a lemma (in the proof of a proposition or as induction hypothesis)) or imply the conclusion.
The basic induction principle formalizing Burstall's intermittent assertions method
We can now sum up what we have learned from the example. For proving
vP~C(S,t,~).3i~Dom(P).~(P~,Pi)~
Burstall's method consists in proving the following:
E~.[((~'</)V(~'=IA~;(S')<~;(S)))AE,,(S')AVS"ES.(B,,(S',S") * 3 j<i.Z!(s,s"))]) v (C)
ws, s')l)l.
(1) However, the exact scope of the above results should be interpreted very cautiously since these proofs only deal with the case of unary intermittent assertions (i.e. which assert a property of states, such as "if sometime P(s) at L then sometime Q( s') at L' ") whereas Burstall's method and induction principle (1) make use of binary intermittent assertions (i.e. which relate states, such as "if sometime P(s) at L then sometime Q(s,s') at L'"). It is often argued that both approaches are equivalent because the effect of binary assertions can be obtained using auxiliary variables and unary assertions. Indeed, initial or intermediate values of program variables can be stored into auxiliary variables the value of which is part of the state. In fact, the use of auxiliary variables and unary assertions is more powerful than the use of binary assertions as in (1). This is because using auxiliary variables one can express relationships between values of the variables at any two different moments in the course of the computation (and even store entire execution traces into history variables). This is not possible with binary assertions since, for example, only the main proposition (and not all lemmas) can depend upon the initial values of the program variables in induction principle (1). However, the use of binary assertions appears to be much more disciplined because the question of when auxiliary variables do have to be introduced is solved once for all.
Our understanding with respect to soundness and completeness of induction principle (1) can be described as follows.
Soundness
Theorem 5.1 (soundness).
(1) = (0)
Proof. We introduce in Section 6 the induction principle (2) an obvious generalization of (1) (so that (1) = (2)) and prove that (2) a(O). 0
Conjectures about semantic incompleteness
Although induction principle (1) only allows to use ranges of natural numbers, it can be used to prove termination of weakly but not strongly terminating programs.
We show this using the following example (taken from [6, p. 3561): is left to the reader. We have indicated after each intermittent assertion which alternative should be chosen.)
As shown by the above example, the greater generality of Burstall's method restricted to natural numbers (which can be used to prove termination of weakly but not strongly terminating programs) over Floyd's method restricted to natural numbers (which can be used to prove only strong termination) is only seeming, because Burstall's method implicitly relies upon the lexicographic ordering on pairs of natural numbers as pointed out by induction principle (1).
Despite this apparent superiority, the order type of the lexicographic ordering on pairs of natural numbers involved in induction principle (1) 
Wf( W,<)=[Rel( W,--C)AVEC W.[Ef0~3y~E.(Vz~E.~(z -c y))]] (this implies that there is no sequence PE(o--+ W) such that pi+ 1 --c pi for all igo.
Assuming the axiom of choice, this property is equivalent to the above definition).
l The left restriction of relation t to E is written tlE:
tjE(s,s')=[seEr, t(s,s')]. et -' is the inverse of relation t: t-'(s',s)=t(s,s').
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4 (Existence of a well-founded relation for inevitability proofs (with initial states independence hypothesis)).

Proof. Assume by reductio ad absurdum that 3p@o+Acc( S, t, 4, $>).Vi~o. tl Znter( S, t, 4, $)(pi9pi+ 1). We can assume that 4(po) holds (else we can adjoin to the left of p a prefix rO...rk of a trace of C(Acc(S, t,$,$), tlZnter(S, t,c$,$),cb> such that q5(ro) holds). By (0) there is a smallest iEDom(p) such that $(po,pi) holds. Hence piEGoal(S,t,c#,$). Also tlZnter(S,t,c$,$)(pi3pi+l) implies p+Znter(S,t,~,rC,) in contradiction with Zsind( S, t, 4, $). 0
Let E be a class of ordinals. Sup(E)= U E will denote the least upper bound of E and Sup + (E) will denote the least strict upper bound of E.
The rank of XE W with respect to a well-founded relation Wf( W, <) is an ordinal defined by transfinite recursion on W as follows:
--c )(y): y--c x).
The rank of a well-founded relation Wf( W,k ) is rk( W,<)=Sup+
{rk( W,-c)(x): XE W}
The global nondeterminism of (S, t, C#J > with respect to $ can be measured by the rank of the inverse of t left restricted to intermediate states:
Definition 5.5 (Rank of the global nondeterminism (with initial states independence hypothesis)). When (0) and Isind (S, t, 4, rc/) hold, we define
rkgrzd(S,t,~,C1/)=rk(Acc(S,t,~,*),tlInter(S,t,~,GI/)-').
Remark. 
C(o)~rsind(S,t,~,~)l=>C(l) with f~(~~(S-trkynd(S,t,~,~)))l.
Proof. Assume (0) and
Isind( S, t, C#J, t,b).
Let us choose n = 2, co(s)=
[sEAcc(S,t,4,r1/>1, ~o(&S'l=l[3P~~(S,t,+), i~oom(p).(Vj<i.l~(p~, Pj)IA *(Po,Pi)A((3k,<i.p,=s)Api=s'l, fo~(Acc(S,t,~,cC/)~rkgnd(S,t,~,*)), .h(~)= rk(Acc(S,t,qkII/), tllnter<S,t,h Ic/>-'1, no=2, I;(S,S')=[EO(S)AS'=S], I~(s,s')= [&O(S)AlBg(S,S)At(S,S')], I;=&, &I=$, e,=lj,
?21=1, I:(S,S')=[E1(S)AS'=S], Iy=O1, TC= 1. All verification conditions are obviously satisfied but for VS,S'ES.
(I;(S,S')Al&(S,
S'))~(f0(S')<,f0(S)AEO(S')AvS"ES.e,(S',S~)~r~(S,S")).
If I~(s,s')~i~,(s,s') holds, we have, by definition of Zh, s0 and (0), that
~P~~(S,t,~),iEDom(P).(Vj<i.l~(P,,pj))A~(Po,Pi)A\k.(s=P,A(k+l)< iAs'=pk+,).
Since s,s'EZnter(S,t,&$) and t(s,s') holds, we have &(s')< fo(s)r\cO(s'). If tI,,(s',s") then 3qEC(S,t,4), i'EDom(q). (Vj<i'.l$(pO,
pj))A\(Po,Pi,)A(3k'di'.q,'=S')Aqi'=S".
We have Vj.(k'<j<i')*lll/(p,,qj)
since otherwise for the smallest j satisfying k'< jci' A $(pO, qj), we would have 
qjElnter( S, t, C/I,+) nGoal(S, t, 4, $).
Observe that q,,EGoal( S, t, 4,$)
Proof. IfsEZnter(S,t,~,IC/)nGoal(S,t,~,IC,),
there are s',s"~S such that lIc/(s',s) and $(s",s), a contradiction. 0
The basic induction principle generalizing Burstall's intermittent assertions method
Although induction principle (1) is sound and semantically complete in a great number of practical situations, we conjecture that it is not general enough to cope with some types of inevitability properties of programs, such as those considered in [lo] for cyclic programs.
Hence the necessity arises of generalizing induction principle (1).
The proposed generalization is quite simple. In order to ensure the existence of well-orderings to be used for induction, lemmas and intermittent assertions should depend upon initial states. Transfinite well-orderings should be used in order to cope with unbounded nondeterminism. These remarks lead from (1) to (2), the last induction principle (2) being later shown to be semantically complete.
[MEW, &E(Ll+P+{tt, ff})), 8+l-*(S3+(tt, ff})),
de&d, &(A + (S2+A)), ne(A+o).
(2)
In order to illustrate the use of this induction principle, let us consider the following example.
Example 6.1. $(x,x')=[x'=~x] is inevitable for (w,t,4) such that t(x,x')=[x'= x+ 1] and $(x)=tt.
Observe that we do not have W'( Acc( S, t, 4, $), tl Inter( S, t, 4, $) -l ).
The inevitability of $ can be proved by induction principle (2) 
I~(~,.x,x')=[~=x=x']
((P), (LI) with l'=O), Zy=tI, (C).
Induction principle (2) is an obvious generalization of (1).
Theorem 6.2 (Generalization of Burstall's method). (1) a (2).
Before tackling the question of semantic completeness, we define which ordinals A~0rd are sufficient in a proof by (2) .
Definition 6.3 (Rank qf the global nondeterminism).
When (0) holds, we define rkgnd(S,t,~,IC/)=Sup'{rk(Acc(S,f,~,~)(s),
tlrnter(S,t,~,II/)(S)-'): sES}.
(This definition is justified by the fact that for all SE& tl Inter( S, t, q5, $)(s) is wellfounded on Act (S, t, 4, $ ) (5). This is proved in [4] .) The proof of semantic completeness of (2) follows from the remark that (2) can be used to express "a la Floyd" proofs.
Theorem 6.4 (Semantic completeness).
(0) * ( (2), with A = rkgnd ( S, t, q5, $ ) (satisfies (LI) with I'=0 and fo(~s)=rk(,4cc(S,t,$,$)(~),
tlrnter(S,t,~,*)(s)-l)(s)
and Zz = f30 (satisfies (C)).
Equivalent induction principles generalizing Burstall's intermittent assertions method
We now derive a series of induction principles which are all shown to be sound and complete and hence equivalent to the basic induction principle (2) . For the sake of conciseness, not all conceivable alternatives have been reported. One purpose of the series of induction principles is to propose more and more abstract formalizations that should lead to a better understanding of Burstall's method. The other purpose of the following proof principles is to broaden the allowed forms of proofs (so as to introduce more flexibility in writing proofs but no additional proof power since all principles are equivalent).
The number of lemmas (al, e,), lid which can be used in induction principle (2) and 60(~,x,x')=[~<x<2~=x']. Eliminating this restriction on names of lemmas, the above informal proposition can also be understood as a shorthand for an infinite number of lemmas of name x such that E,(X) = [x < x < 2x1 and Qx(x, x') = [x G x 9 2~ =x']. This point of view is consistent with the fact that the sole purpose of program initial state 2 in induction principle (2) is to offer the ability to use well-orderings for induction on the data that depend upon program initial states. These well-orderings can also be distinguished by giving them different names, one per program initial state. Also the main proposition (4, $) need not be the consequence of a single lemma (E,, 0,) as in (2) but could also be the consequence of different lemmas for different program initial states. These remarks lead to the following induction principle.
AEOrd, f~(/l+(s+A)), n~(A-w).
VSES.~~EA.(E,(S)=~(S)AVS'ES.~,(S,S')=$(S,S'))A
(vaE/i.3z,E(n,+ l+(S2+{tt, ff))).
Vidn,, s,s'~S.
[&a(S) * 12th s)] A (3)
Theorem 7.1. (2) =S (3).
Proof. The objects which are different in induction principles (2) and (3) but have been given the same name (such as A, E, . .) will be referred to using indices 2 and 3 (such as A2,A3,a2,c3 ,...) in the proof.
By the axiom of choice, there is an ordinal .Z and a one-to-one function 6 that maps E into S. C x A2 well-ordered by the lexicographic ordering (s', 1') -C (s, /) if and only if ((s' < s) v (s' = s A 1' <I)) is isomorphic with A, ic C ( k is ordinal multiplication) by the order isomorphism I= i( s, I). [( A2 9 s) 4 I], ( i is ordinal addition). We let (a,z) be the inverse of r so that ~E((A~ icZ)+C), j.
~((il~ icZ)-+Az) and VZE(A~AZ).[CI=~((~(U),E,(C()))].
We choose The names CCEA of the lemmas (a,, 6,) in (3) are well-ordered. For a given lemma (E,, 8,) , the role of fI is to introduce a well-ordering on the initial states of lemma (E,, 6,). The same effect can be obtained by considering not a single lemma (a,, 0,) but a family of lemmas { ( F~,,~,,~,, ~IQ,~) ): SES}. This point of view is more abstract in that only one well-ordering (IV<) need to be used. It is defined by (x',,L(s'))+ <GAS)) if and only if (c~'<~~v(cc'=cr~f,~(s')<f,(s))) on W= { ( r,fz(s)): MEA A SES}. Hence, up to an isomorphism we can use ordinals and rephrase induction principle (3) as follows: (5) we consider the inevitability proof of a given lemma 0, and this proof can be obtained without (LI) then the verification conditions (P), (HS) and (C) strongly resemble the verification conditions corresponding to Floyd's proof method [7] as formalized by induction principle (5) of Cousot and Cousot [4] . Stated otherwise, in invariant Z~(S,S'), i plays the role of the nonnegative integer which is strictly decremented at each program step. By comparison with Floyd's method we observe that (5) imposes two unnecessary restrictions on i: n, is a bound on the number of program steps and this number is independent of the considered initial state, n, (hence i) should be an integer (so that e.g. unbounded nondeterminism cannot be handled without (LI)).
Vi<n,, s,s'ES. C&,(S) * I2(s,
We first relax the first limitation, choosing n, as ordinal. 
tlrnter(S,t,~,IC/)(S)-')(s)): [3nEOrd,BE(A~(S',{tt,ff})),AEOrd,r~(n x A+(S'+{tt,ff})). (v's~S.3n~ll.vS'ES.[e,(S,S')=(~(S)~~(S,S'))])A
(V~C(E A, s, s'ES, S'E A.
ptkd.I;(s,s)]
A [l;'(s,s')* Proof. Choose (1,=n,, Q6=05, A,=o,
The use of well-orderings (or up to order-isomorphisms of ordinals) in (6) is not mandatory. Well-founded relations can as well serve as a basis for induction. Also as observed by Schwarz [12], Burstall's method can be explained as the mathematical deduction of theorems from axioms specifying the effect of elementary commands in the program. This informal explanation of Burstall's method can be formalized by considering the transition relation in the previous proof principles as a set of axioms or a given lemma from which other lemmas are derived. One difference (that had not to be taken into account by Schwarz [12] , who considers only total deterministic programs) is that inevitability of t for (S, t, h.tt) holds only for states which have at least one successor. Moreover, the deduction process that Schwarz [12] left unspecified is always reducible to transfinite induction.
Finally, the main proposition E.(s, s').[~(s) = $(s, s')] can always be chosen as one of the lemmas intervening in the proof. Therefore, if we write Wj ( W, --c, p) to state that --K is a well-founded relation on W with minimal element ,u, i.e.
The above remarks lead to the following induction principle: rqn x A+(S2+t, ff})). 
A7=(A6u2), <,= <6= <, bh~S')=[(~=PA t(S,S'))V(C(=A6A(~(S)~ICI(S,S')))V(C(</16A &,(S,S'))i,~7:(S, S')=[(ff=~)V(CI=~gA~=1AS'=S)V(~=/16A~=OA(~(S)~IC/(S,S')))V(tl</16A
I,:
(s,s'))l. 0
In induction principle (7) the verification condition (36~4 .Zi(s, s)] implies that lemma 8, is inevitable for (S, t, As.tt ). But for the main proposition 8, this property is not necessary. We need only the fact that tIa should be inevitable for the particular states for which it is used. Hence the verification condition [36~d.Z~(s,s)] of (7) can be weakened in: 
crk( W,<).[cr#a'=E( W,<)(a)n E( W,~)(C(')=C#J] and VXE W.jcrErk( w,<).[x~E( W,<)(a)].
By the axiom of choice, there is a linear ordering <(W,<)(x) which well-orders E( w, <)(a).
Define p( W, -c)(x,y)=rk[E( W,<)(rx),+( W,-<)(rx)][y]
where rx is rk( W,<)(x) and To prove that (7) * (8) is now immediate when choosing & =Sup + { I( d7 -p, -<7)(x): xE(&"P))I,%=r(n,-P, +7)(7-r,), ~8a(S,S')=C3a~(n,-~).
Define y( W,--c)=Sup+{~( W,~)(X): XE W} so that VXE W.[E( W, -c)(x) --c y( W,--c)] and I( W,-c)(x)=y( W,-c)ic rk( W, -c)(x)+4 W,-<)(x).
(E=r(n7-P, -<,)(u)A~~~(s,s'))],~~=SUP+~Z(~~, c7)(x): x~d,} and Is8(s,s')=[3a~(n,-v~),
The use of lemmas 0, in induction principle (8) is redundant because we can use instead some intermittent assertion Zz for some 6 such that I,d(s,s') = oa(s, s'). By convention, we can choose 6=0 so that induction principle (8) can be simplified as follows: [UEOrd, TEA, AEOrd, IE(A x A-+(Sz-+(tt, R}) ). (v'sGS.36EA.z~(s, s) s'))l. 0
(vS,S'ES.I,O(S,S')=(~(S)~~(S,S')))A
As shown by the succession of transformations, the proof that in (9) a state s' satisfying Zl'(s,s') inevitably leads to a state s" such that Ba(s,s") holds involve an induction along parts of computation paths modeled by 6' and an induction upon the data modeled by CL In order to make a comparison with Floyd's method, both cases can be reduced to computational induction using y' measuring the "number of steps" remaining to be done between s' and s": (2)- (10) follows from the following theorem. Assume this holds for y'<y. By reductio ad absurdum let s~S,p~C (S,t,h'.Z,(s,s')) be such that V'i~Dom(p).lZ,,,,(S,pi).
To get a contradiction we build an infinite sequence (( ik, yk) : ,,(s,p,,) A c~(y~)=c ( (,,,(p,+'",pf'") (where p+j is the subsequence pj pj+ 1 . . of p). If we let ik+ 1 be ik +j it follows that Z,cy~i(pik, pik f 1 1 holds whence ~Y~+~<Y~.CZ~,,I(S,P~*+I)A~(Y~+~)=~(Y~)=~(Y)I. Q.E.D.
Now if pEC(S,f,@)
then 3y~Z-.Z, (p~,p~) so that p~C (S,r,E.s'.Z.,(p,,s') ) and by the above lemma 3i~Dom(p).l, (,,(p,,pi) .
Strong semantic completeness
The semantic completeness argument given in Theorem 6.4 is very weak because it essentially consists in saying that (2) can always be used to formulate "a la Floyd" proofs (as suggested by Manna and Waldinger [lo] We now give a stronger semantic completeness result showing that the lemmas involved in "a la Burstall" proofs can always be chosen more freely.
First we have to introduce an induction principle (11) where the choice between "hand simulation"
(HS) and "a little induction" (LI) is enforced. In particular, the lemmas that are to be used in (LI) should be imposed. For that purpose we consider a version of (6) where we introduce a choice relation lJs,s',cr') so that intermittent assertion Zi'(s, s') can be handled using lemma CI' < CI if and only if ioL( s, s', a') holds. (Observe that a dependence of z on 6' would only be useful to impose the use of identity lemmas, a case of little importance that we exclude for simplicity). To simplify later reasonings, (HS) will be treated in the style of (7) as a particular subcase of (LI) so that the transition relation t is viewed as a particular lemma, say QO, given as axiom.
Moreover, as observed for (S), the verification condition [36~d .If(s, s)] of (6) or (7) implies that lemma 8, is inevitable for (S, t, h.tt ). However, this is needed only for the particular states s for which 8, may be used, i.e. when 3~ <tl, s'~S.z,,(s', s, a).
Finally, since all lemmas enjoy the same kind of inevitability properties there is no real need to distinguish a particular main proposition. These remarks lead to the following induction principle (where AEOrd, ~9~(A-+(S~+{tt,ff})), 8,=t and ~E(A~O-+(SXSXA~{~~,~~}))):
[SlEOrd, x d+(S2+{tt, ff})).
(VC(E(A-O), SES.[(3c('E(L4-O), S'ES.Z,~(S',S,tl))~36~4.f~(S,S)])A
(VE(A-O), S,S'ES, S'EA.
[Z2'(s,s') =a
We first show that (I 1) is yet another formulation of the induction principles generalizing But-stall's method. Ae,=tA(ll))]*@).
18~(s,s')=ifa=0 then ff else Illf(s,s'). 0
Because we no longer distinguish a main proposition 8, as in (0), soundness of (11) Proof. Follows from the later proved Theorems 8.5 and 8.6. 0
We are mainly concerned about the semantic completeness of (11). The reciprocal of Theorem 8.3 is not true. Obviously, (12) holds. If (11) were true then we would have z,(u,u, 2) hence 36,~d.I$ '(u,a) and by r2(u,u,1) and @,(a,~) we would have 36,<6,.1F(u,c). But 1 Q,( a, c) and V'cr ' < 2.1 12( a, c, a') Proof. Assume (11). If /1= 1 or VU', s'.l la,(s', s, U) then (13) obviously holds, else we prove (13) by transfinite induction on cre(/l-0). Given ae(n-0) and s~S, assume by reductio ad absurdum that 3tl'~/i, s'~S,pgC( S, ~as,~~.
[~=~]).la,(~',~,~) A V'i~Dom(p). lO,(p,,pi) .
To get a contradiction, we show that it is then possible to build an infinite sequence ((6,, ik): ka0) such that Vk>O.Z,dk(s,pi,) holds and (6,:
is an infinite strictly decreasing chain of ordinals. We have z,,(s',s,M) so that by (11) In particular fors'=pc3ra(s,ph,~)holdsandZ (S,r ap,,, &.[s=pJ) is not empty so that we derive 3S"ES.0~(pik,s"), whence 3S"ES.ras(Pikrs").
Since pik is not a blocking state ik+ 1 =it+ 1 belongs to Dam(p) and we have ras(pik,Pik+,). It follows that 3cl'<a.I,(s,pi~,CI')AOBa,(pir,piktt)) whence 36k+1<6k.I~+l(~,~i~+~). q Condition (13) (i.e. each lemma is inevitable relatively to the lemmas used in its proof) implies condition (12) (i.e. each lemma is inevitable relatively to the transition system):
Theorem 8.6 (Inevitability relative to z implies inevitability relative to t). (13) * (12).
Proof. Assume (13), we prove (12) by transfinite induction on @A -0). Assume by reductio ad absurdum, that 3peC (S, t,h.[3a',s'.l,,(s',s,a) 
]).
VieDom(p).
10,(pO,pi).
To get a contradiction, we shall build an infinite sequence (i,: k>O) such that piOpi, . . . is a counterexample to (13), i.e. Zlcr', s' .r,,(s',piO, rx We first prove that (13) + (Vae(n -0) SES. Wf(Ac,,, t,,j In,,-') ). This is obvious when tix'~n,s'~S.l~,,(s',s,~~) since AC,, is empty. Else, given x~ (il-0) and SCS such that ~cx'E~,s'ES.I,,(S',S, 2) assume, by reductio ad absurdum, that 3p~ (o~Ac,,) . Vi~o.t, , 11n, , (pi, pi+l (Ac, , , ~, , 1In, , a~(ii-O)ASSES~, l I~ '(s,s')=[s'EAc,,Afi'=rk(Ac,,,~,,lln,,ml)(s') ].
If ZE(/~-O), SES and C!C('E(~ -0) s'~S.~,,(s',s,r) then SEAC,, so that Zi(s,s) holds with 6=rk (Ac,,,zZsl In,,-')(s).
Assume CCE(L~-O), s,s'~S, 6'~d and Z~'(S,S'). We have s'EAc,,.
If s'EGo,, then oa(s, s') holds. Else s'EIn,, so that by (13) there exists S"ES such that T,,( s', s"), hence some c~'<tl such that I~(s,s',x') A (~,.(s',s"). If a'=0 we conclude Ys"eS.t(s',s") since &=t. Else r'#O and if Vs"~S.~t(s',s") then (s')EZ(S,~,~.S'.[~~~,S.I,(S,S',~')]), whence by (13) (2) without (LI)) and Burstall's method (more precisely (2) ) are strongly equivalent in the sense that a proof by one method can be translated into a proof by the other method.
Conclusion
Our study and generalization of Burstall's method should be extended (e.g. in the style of [4]) so as to take fairness hypotheses for parallel programs into account. It should also be extended from a methodological point of view in order to obtain better presentations of Burstall's method and broader applications e.g. for logic programs.
